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Review Essay
“James Madison Problems”: Three New Works
G R E G W E I N E R
The Mind of James Madison: The Legacy of Classical Republicanism.
By Colleen Sheehan. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
Pp. 275. Cloth, $95.00.)
James Madison and Constitutional Imperfection. By Jeremy D. Bai-
ley. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015. Pp. 181. Paper,
$29.99.)
Madison’s Hand: Revising the Constitutional Convention. By Mary
Sarah Bilder. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015. Pp. 358.
Cloth, $35.00.)
The long-running debate over what Gordon Wood called the “James
Madison problem” centers largely around the status of public opinion in
Madison’s thought: whether, in other words, it was to be regarded as an
object of concern or a salutary force, whether Madison changed his mind
on that question between helping to frame the constitutional order and
serving within it and, finally, whether, if he did so, his motives were
opportunistic.1 More recent scholarship on Madison has sought strands
of consistency that transcend Wood’s problem.2 Still, the theoretical
1. Gordon S. Wood, Revolutionary Characters: What Made the Founders Dif-
ferent (New York, 2006).
2. See, inter alia, Alan Gibson, “Madison’s ‘Great Desideratum’: Impartial
Administration and the Extended Republic,’ ” American Political Thought 1, no. 2
(2012), 181–207; and Greg Weiner, Madison’s Metronome: The Constitution,
Majority Rule and the Tempo of American Politics (Lawrence, KS, 2012).
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standing of public opinion remains challenging terrain for interpreters of
Madison. Of course, that Madison’s thought might have evolved need
not scandalize, but if it did change, it would be helpful to understand
exactly how and why. Three new books help to shed light on that ques-
tion, among others.
Colleen Sheehan’s The Mind of James Madison: The Legacy of Classi-
cal Republicanism exegetes his “Notes on Government,” uncovering the
classical roots of what she argues was his belief, at least as of 1791, in a
regime that helps to give public opinion shape. Jeremy Bailey’s James
Madison and Constitutional Imperfection is a wide-ranging and often sur-
prising exploration of several untreated aspects of Madison’s thought,
including his alliance with Thomas Jefferson and what Bailey sees as his
use of public opinion to complete the constitutional project. Finally,
Mary Sarah Bilder’s Madison’s Hand: Revising the Constitutional Con-
vention asserts that Madison’s Notes of the Philadelphia convention as
we have them today are the product of a lifelong modification designed
to shape public opinion, largely public perceptions of Madison himself.
These works come amid a recent renewal of historiographical interest
in Madison, including a spate of biographies from Lynne Cheney, Jeff
Broadwater, and Kevin R. C. Gutzman, among others. Andrew Burstein
and Nancy Isenberg’s definitive Madison and Jefferson has plumbed new
depths of the Founding’s most enduring intellectual and political part-
nership.3 These, combined with the University of Virginia’s publication
of the first in a projected seven volumes of Madison’s content-rich retire-
ment papers, have stoked new interest in the Virginia scholar–statesman.
This trio of new books from Sheehan, Bailey, and Bilder are turning that
interest back toward his political thought.
Sheehan sees the “intellectual journey” of the “Notes” as “a retrieval
of the ancient quest to vindicate republican government” (13). Madison’s
guide on the journey is Jean-Jacques Barthe´lemy, the French author of
Voyage of Anacharsis, which Jefferson sent to Madison on the eight-
volume work’s publication in 1789. Sheehan suggests that Madison
regarded the ancient and modern solutions to the internal stability of
3. Lynne Cheney, James Madison: A Life Reconsidered (New York, 2014); Jeff
Broadwater, James Madison: A Son of Virginia and a Founder of the Nation
(Chapel Hill, NC, 2012); Kevin R. C. Gutzman, James Madison and the Making
of America (New York, 2012); Andrew Burstein and Nancy Isenberg, Madison
and Jefferson (New York, 2010).
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republics—the former as the education of public opinion via singular
institution, the latter taming it with institutional arrangements and self-
interest—as something of a false dichotomy. “In carefully investigating
the various influences on government and, particularly, the powerful
effect of public opinion on the operations of government in an extensive,
federal republic, Madison believed he had discovered a way in which the
safety and the liberty of citizens, including their participation in the
active sovereignty of the regime, could be achieved” (17).
The key to this is communication. Thus in the “Notes,” Madison,
reflecting on the problem of size, counsels that a republic cannot be too
small—because, as he had noted in Federalist 10, it would be consumed
by faction—but also not too large, because public opinion could not
form. Devices that facilitate communication—roads, newspapers, com-
merce, and the like—counter the otherwise diluting effect of territorial
sprawl. This public opinion, in Sheehan’s account of Madison, must do
more than aggregate individual views. “Instead, it must be transformed
to become the ‘reason of the society’—or, in other words, impartial deci-
sions about the public good” (42). So conceived, public opinion, as
Madison would later write in the National Gazette, not only “sets bounds
to every government,” it is also “the real sovereign in every free one”
(49).
Yet size presented unique challenges, especially to “the classical
notion of a genuinely participatory and free citizenry.” Madison’s discov-
ery in the “Notes,” Sheehan argues, was “a way to achieve political lib-
erty in a large republic” by supplementing Montesquieu’s idea of liberty
as security with the ancient idea of “the citizen’s liberty, which is mani-
fest in the citizen’s active participation in the sovereignty” (62–63). The
core of the idea was the sovereignty of public opinion. Sheehan writes,
“Derived from the will of the society, public opinion is the result of a
process of public communication and deliberation that refines, enlarges,
and transforms public views into the reason of the society. In turn, the
reason of the society operates on the understanding and interest of the
society” (64). The task in Madison’s eyes was to “educat[e] public opin-
ion in the moral principles of republicanism, thereby establishing a polit-
ical system in which the will of the society is based on the reason of the
society,” which depended not on institutions, but rather on “the sound-
ness of public opinion” (71).
This pedagogical process, which is the rub, occurs through what
Madison calls the “commerce of ideas,” including cultural influences,
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religious teachings, customs and mores, and public morality (84–85).
Representation and political devices—the Bill of Rights, for example—
could also serve pedagogical functions. Similarly, federalism, by splitting
the public into local polities, facilitates the formation and collection of
public opinion.
The difficulty is that the “Notes”—which are, after all, an outline, not
a completed work—are strikingly devoid of detail on how precisely this
process of public education is to operate. They constitute, in that sense,
more a hope than a solution. To be sure, this is less a problem with
Sheehan’s analysis than with the incomplete state of Madison’s project.
Nonetheless, before the “Notes” is elevated to the canonical status she
advocates, more work on this question might be done. That is, while we
might be persuaded that communication can facilitate the formation of
public opinion in an extended territory, why, exactly, should we expect
the “commerce of ideas” to produce the right—that is, morally upright—
ideas? Why should it not be just as likely a mass commerce in ideas
would dilute moral rigor? Perhaps a proper “republican distribution of
citizens” (258), as the title of one chapter in the “Notes” holds, would
help, but here again we are saddled with more aspiration than strategy.
Sheehan’s book also raises the question of the place of the “Notes” in
the Madisonian corpus. Sheehan sees it as central, and once one enters
that space with her, her exegesis—especially her excavation of its roots
in ancient sources as refracted through Barthe´lemy—is excellent. But in
this book, the “Notes” are largely extracted from Madison’s larger work.
This leaves the sense that Madison is an unadulterated Aristotelian,
which, in turn, never comes to grips with competing strands in his
thought. It is, of course, not Sheehan’s stated ambition to deal with the
whole of Madison, and the depth with which she explores this piece of
him is a valuable contribution. It may nonetheless be truer to say there
are Aristotelian influences on or strains in Madison than to say he is an
Aristotelian simply. In any case, future commentators will be compelled
to incorporate or refute the Madison of the “Notes” into their scholar-
ship thanks to the extent to which Sheehan has made it the centerpiece
of hers.
Bailey treats a much broader Madison by means of unsettling some of
the most widely held—one is tempted to say “venerated”—assumptions
about him, the result of which is an invaluable contribution to Madison
scholarship. Bailey takes his bearings from dissatisfaction with the tradi-
tional bifurcation between Madisonian constitutionalism, which mediates
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popular will, and Jeffersonian republicanism, which channels it. The
reality, he notes, is that Madison spent the bulk of his career helping
Jefferson mobilize public opinion. Bailey explores this puzzle through
the prism of constitutional imperfection, by which he means “the gaps
that necessarily arise because no constitution can anticipate every contin-
gency and opportunity” and “the flaws that derive from the errors of the
founders” (1).
Bailey’s treatment of this problem repeatedly upends conventional
wisdom. He complicates, for example, Madison’s widely hailed case for
constitutional veneration in Federalist 49, noting that in an “underap-
preciated” 1785 letter to Caleb Wallace discussing a constitution for
Kentucky, Madison recommended scheduling a “revision” after a gener-
ation (22–23). Why, then, warn against such a revision in the case of the
federal constitution? Drawing on correspondence, Bailey upsets consen-
sus views of Madison that see him as preferring the deliberative rule of
elites. Such views do not properly distinguish, Bailey argues, between
ordinary and founding politics. Madison was specifically and clearly
skeptical “of deliberation among leading politicians during moments of
founding. . . . [T]he source of concern for Madison was not the men
who would be doing the discussing, but rather the subject matter itself”
(34).
Madison thus suggests, amid his catalog of constitutional imperfec-
tions in Federalist 37, that a diversity of factions might help to administer
a government but would complicate the task of forming it. “In this
remarkable discussion, Madison went as far as to narrow the applicability
of his famous discovery, the extended republic as a solution for faction”
(36). On Bailey’s reading, Madison’s task in Federalist 49 was not to
make an unqualified case for veneration—which his “confession” of
imperfections in Federalist 37 would have complicated—but rather the
immediate imperative of dissuading Edmund Randolph and other mod-
erates from insisting on a second convention. Veneration, Bailey asserts,
even provides a “veneer” of democratic legitimacy to founding moments
in which deliberation is not always possible (46).
Bailey is more open to the idea of deliberation during times of ordi-
nary politics, but he notes Madison’s significant omission of the word in
The Federalist after his use of it to describe foundings of ancient repub-
lics. Even in the closest case, Federalist 63’s argument that the Senate
will facilitate the prevalence of the “cool and deliberate sense of the
community,” it is the community’s sense, not that of the elites, to which
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Madison refers—and even then, Bailey believes Hamilton wrote the essay
under consideration (46–47). “In the view of this author,” Bailey writes,
“there is very little evidence that Madison ever expected that members
of either house of Congress would engage in deliberation” (48).
Bailey further complicates the case for Madisonian institutionalism as
a source of stability with his insightful treatment of the First Congress’s
debate over the removal power—a case of constitutional imperfection in
the sense of a silence that had to be filled in. In that debate, Bailey shows,
Madison opposed involving the Senate in the removal of executive offi-
cials because doing so would entail excessive stability and because Madi-
son “was well on his way to seeing the president as accountable to a
national electorate” and thus to public opinion (61). The importance of
the much overlooked removal debate is that it represented the working
out of a constitutional imperfection that involved “the balancing of stabil-
ity and republican responsibility, a difficulty Madison discussed at length
in Federalist No. 37” (68).
Bailey plows his newest ground by attending to what he calls “the
middle Madison,” the period between Madison’s service as secretary of
state and the eruption of retirement writings in the 1820s. The “central
problem in understanding Madison’s political thought over his career,”
Bailey writes, is why he became and remained a Jeffersonian (115).
Bailey explores this by seeing Jefferson’s “Revolution of 1800” as “a
practical solution to the problem of constitutional imperfection” (116).
He notes that Madison suggested an extra-constitutional, opinion-
oriented resolution to the electoral crisis of 1800, one in which Jefferson
and Aaron Burr would jointly call Congress into session to resolve the
choice of president. Bailey sees Madison as somewhat tempering Jeffer-
sonian prerogative but nonetheless serving as “a loyal foot soldier, a
faithful son, and a central adviser in Jefferson’s transformation of the
political order” (140).
Bailey’s assessment of Madison’s decision to compile his notes of the
Constitutional convention calls scholarly attention for the first time to a
letter Madison sent the Virginia legislator and judge John G. Jackson. In
it, Madison acknowledged two flaws in the Philadelphia Convention’s
deliberations: first, being, in Bailey’s words, “overly influenced by cur-
rent events” (167), such as Shay’s Rebellion; and second, rushing to
complete its work. “[M]adison said he would have qualified his prefer-
ence for stability had he had more time for ‘reflection’ during the Con-
vention” (167–68).
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In all, Bailey’s urging that scholars look from “Madisonian constitu-
tionalism” to his republican impulses as seen through the problem of
constitutional imperfection is a persuasive and welcome corrective. It
has, at moments, its limits. Madison’s concern with institutions remains
evident throughout his career, as Bailey is scrupulous to note. Both insti-
tutions and opinion may be necessary ingredients of a regime; there is
not an inherent dichotomy between them. Nor, in fairness, does Bailey
suggest one, but he at times verges on it. His downplaying of Congres-
sional deliberation is one such instance. Federalist 55 does indicate, as
Bailey notes, that all large assemblies “of whatever characters composed”
will behave like mobs, but this not a surrender to the inevitable, it is
a defense of Madison’s institutional solution: a small House. (Indeed,
Madison’s wish that he had himself had more time for “reflection” at the
Convention suggests at least a desire for deliberation.) Still, even to the
extent the chief contribution of this book lies in dismantling conventional
wisdom—and it is likely to be succeed in forging some new wisdom as
well—the result is a landmark enterprise.
Bilder, too, seeks to dismantle conventional wisdom, which holds that
Madison’s Notes of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 are the most
reliable source of the interior workings of that endeavor. Utilizing the
skills of both a literary and historical detective—she has both excavated
clues in the text and subjected the original notes to rigorous physical
examination, observing, for example, differences in paper, ink, and
watermarks—Bilder concludes in this well-written and engaging work
that Madison revised the Notes over the course of his life.
Among the more provocative and significant of Bilder’s assertions is
that the eleventh item in Madison’s pre-convention “Vices of the Political
System of the United States” memorandum—the one that prefigured the
extended republic thesis of Federalist 10—may have been added after
the Convention, calling the originality of the theory into question. Simi-
larly, she argues that his famed June 6 speech on factions—again presag-
ing the argument of Federalist 10—was composed after the Convention
and inserted into the notes retrospectively (73). The strong suggestion
is that he cribbed it from Gouverneur Morris’s speech on July 19 (117).
Bilder also records Madison as replacing or revising speeches to shape
opinions of himself. Most significantly, Bilder argues that Madison
attempted after the fact to conceal the extent of his support of slavery.
Noting striking similarities between Madison’s and Luther Martin’s con-
demnations of slavery, Bilder wonders whether, after the Convention,
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Madison inserted statements of his own late in the record of the debates.
This is partly because she establishes that Madison’s Notes after August
21 appear to have been composed in the fall of 1789, and thus these
entries, including his own speeches, may be tinged with retrospective
wishes and contemporary politics.
All these are useful insights. Yet Bilder also repeatedly imputes
motives to Madison with scant external evidence. In one illustrative if
not central example, she devotes a paragraph to suggesting that Madison
may have misspelled delegates’ names—which she acknowledges was
common in the period’s correspondence—to poke fun at those he dis-
liked. Bilder speculates, also without evident basis: The fact that letters
are missing after more than 225 years acquires the sinister connotation
that Madison “might”—only “might”—have divulged confidential infor-
mation that led to their destruction (56). She records changes in copying
the Notes that possess no seeming significance, such as excluding “Mr.”
from names (185).
Even setting such deficiencies aside, this question remains: Supposing
every conclusion Bilder draws is true, then what? That is, if—as certainly
appears to be the case—her physical evidence of revision is unimpeach-
able, in what significant ways does it change our understanding of Madi-
son? That his views on slavery were unsatisfactory and even hypocritical
was already known. That he was a politician concerned with perceptions
of himself is equally unsurprising. As to the originality of his theory on
factions, its outlines were latent as early as his April 1787 correspon-
dence with George Washington. This book, in the end, has historical
value as what Bilder calls it: a “biography of the Notes.” But the extent
to which it provides insight into Madison’s mind in addition to his hand
is less clear. Still, the revisions Madison used that hand to make are
nonetheless intriguing, even if not as theoretically significant as Bilder
suggests. Especially given the paucity of historical work on the Notes
themselves as opposed to their content, the research underlying this
book remains a valuable contribution.
All told, the Madison who emerges from these three works is more
variegated and complicated than the one we knew before. While Bilder
raises questions about the canonical and unadulterated standing of the
convention notes, Sheehan deepens our understanding of the “Notes
on Government,” raising important questions about whether they are
accorded adequate weight in treatments of Madison. Bailey’s unsettling
of seemingly settled questions is a relentless delight for the Madison
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scholar on the hunt for new corners of the founder’s thought to explore.
The combined result of all three works—a new series of “James Madison
problems,” in the sense of new Madison questions—makes this a chal-
lenging, and therefore promising, time for Madison scholars.
Greg We iner is assistant professor of political science at Assumption
College. He is the author of Madison’s Metronome: The Constitution,
Majority Rule and the Tempo of American Politics (Lawrence, KS, 2012)
and is currently working on a book on the Supreme Court’s role in
constitutional interpretation.
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